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ABSTRACT
Traditional Blockchain Sharding approaches can only tolerate up
to n/3 of nodes being adversary because they rely on the hyperge-
ometric distribution to make a failure (an adversary does not have
n/3 of nodes globally but can manipulate the consensus of a Shard)
hard to happen. The system must maintain a large Shard size (the
number of nodes inside a Shard) to sustain the low failure probabil-
ity so that only a small number of Shards may exist. In this paper,
we present a new approach of Blockchain Sharding that can with-
stand up to n/2 of nodes being bad. We categorise the nodes into
different classes, and every Shard has a fixed number of nodes from
different classes. We prove that this design is much more secure
than the traditional models (only have one class) and the Shard
size can be reduced significantly. In this way, many more Shards
can exist, and the transaction throughput can be largely increased.
The improved Blockchain Sharding approach is promising to serve
as the foundation for decentralised autonomous organisations and
decentralised database.
KEYWORDS
Decentralised ledger, Blockchain, Blockchain Sharding, PBFT
ACM Reference Format:
YibinXu and YangyuHuang. 2020. An n/2 Byzantine node tolerate Blockchain
Sharding approach. In The 35th ACM/SIGAPP Symposium on Applied Com-
puting (SAC ’20), March 30-April 3, 2020, Brno, Czech Republic. ACM, New
York, NY, USA, 5 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3341105.3374069
1 INTRODUCTION
Blockchain Sharding is an approach that implements the idea of
Sharding [1] in blockchain to increase the transaction through-
put without raising the bandwidth and processing requirements of
nodes. By allowing multiple committees (Shards) running in par-
allel, the nodes inside every Shard solely process the data in their
Shard, which leads to the system throughput increasing a lot.
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Because the essence of a blockchain is in being decentralised
and permissionless, and so it should allow as many devices as pos-
sible to participate in the system, the idea of Blockchain Shard-
ing is a promising solution to solve the dilemma between increas-
ing performance on one hand and increasing decentralisation on
the other hand. Previous work on Sharding has explored various
ideas (Elastico [2], RSCoin [3], OmniLedger [4], RapidChain [5])
that can withstand up to 1/4 or 1/3 of network nodes being mali-
cious. These approaches only support a small number of Shards in
the system, or, equivalently, they require a large number of nodes
in each Shard, both of which impact performance negatively.
In this paper, we propose a new Blockchain Sharding approach
that can withstand up to n/2 of malicious nodes in the system.
Compared to other methods, the probability that the malicious
nodes will control a Shard is lower, and only a small number of
nodes are required for every Shard to function securely. So that
the communication costs inside every Shard are smaller and more
Shards can exist in parallel, and that improves the transaction per
second globally.
2 BLOCKCHAIN SHARDING HYPOTHESIS
If we are inside a forest recording the time when trees fall, it is not
necessarily for everyone to hear every fall of the tree to maintain
the fairness of the system. The fact that a tree falls and the time
when a tree falls is correct when it is recognised by most people
around the tree assumed these persons have not colluded. With
a sufficient number of people, if they are assigned randomly and
completely distributed to subareas in the forest and are reassigned
time by time to avoid the accumulation of adversary power, collu-
sion is hard to happen (expected to occur in years). As long as the
random and distributed assignment is secured, follow the princi-
ple of proportionality, taking control of a subarea requires a signif-
icant effort similar to taken the whole system when there is only
one area.
In particular, this proposal is secure when (1) only people as-
signed to a subarea of the forest are legal to record the informa-
tion about this subarea. (2) any person cannot control or predict
which subarea it is about to be assigned in. (3) the assignment
follows a globally recognised rule, not by the arbitrary willing of
some specific group of superior people. (4) people are periodically
reassigned. (5) the number of people inside every Shard is large
enough.
If the above criteria are fulfilled, and with a sufficient number of
honest people, one would only need to check what is the common
recognised time of falling for a tree of their interest from the sub-
area where this tree belongs to, it is not necessary for themselves
to hear the falling. In this way, people do not need to have super
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hearing power when the forest is dense. Instead, they only need to
focus on monitoring the subarea where they are assigned to.
Forest Forest
Transitional blockchain Blockchain Sharding
Oversee the whole forest. Oversee a subarea.
Figure 1: The philosophy of Blockchain Sharding
2.1 Failure Probability
The probability of obtaining no less than x adversary nodes when
randomly picking a Shard sized m (m is the number of nodes in-
side the Shard) can be calculated by the cumulative hypergeomet-
ric distribution function without replacement from a population
of n nodes. Let X denote the random variable corresponding to
the number of adversary nodes in the sampled group. The failure
probability for one committee is at most
Pr [X > [m/2]] =
m∑
X=[m/2]
(t
X
)(n−t
m−X
)
(nm)
(1)
which calculates the probability that no less than X nodes are ad-
versary in a group ofm nodes and t is the number of nodes con-
trolled by the adversary globally.
The hypergeometric distribution depends directly on the total
population size (i.e., n). Due to n can change time by time in a
permissionless network (open-membership), the failure probabil-
ity might be affected consequently. To maintain the desired fail-
ure probability, each Shard in RapidChain runs a consensus in pre-
determined intervals (e.g. once a week), to agree on a new commit-
tee size, based on which, the committee will accept more nodes to
join the committee in future epochs.
Figure 2 shows the maximum probability to fail with n = 2000
andm = n/s where s is the number of Shards.
As can be seen from the result, the system has a very high fail-
ure chance when the adversary taken n/2 of nodes, even if there
are only 7 Shards. That is the main reason why all the Blockchain
Sharding approaches so far are only withstanding up to n/3 of
nodes being bad.
If every iteration lasts for 30 minutes, then the time to secure a
fail with the 10−6 failure chance withn/3 of nodes being bad is over
57 years. There cannot be more than 10 Shards when n = 2000 and
a 10−6 failure chance is maintained. The block interval (length of
every synchronisation iteration) cannot be shortened; otherwise,
it also reduces the time to fail. In Nakamoto blockchain, a block
is published in every 10 minute with over 1000 transactions in-
side the block. Thus, the transactions embedded to the Nakamoto
blockchain per hour is over 6000. If we set the same block size for
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Figure 2: the chance to fail when n = 2000, t = n/3, t = n/2
andm = n/s where s is the number of Shards;
the Blockchain Sharding approaches, with 30 minutes block inter-
val, it can only process over 20000 transactions per hour with 10
Shards. However, considering all the additional designs, the low-
ered Byzantine fault tolerate rate, the slowed block interval and the
failure in the next 57 years, people may wonder whether a tripled
performance worth all the costs.
3 THE N/2 BYZANTINE NODE TOLERATED
BLOCKCHAIN SHARDING APPROACH
In this section, we discuss our approach in more details.
3.1 Our Hypothesis
Instead of recording the time of tree fallings inside a forest, imag-
ine nodes are juries inside the courtrooms.We rule that a sentence
is made when more than a predefined T number of people inside
the jury sizedm reached a consensus (the predefinedT must larger
than 0.5 ×m). Every jury should havem people inside, and these
people are fromm different occupations. For example, let’s assume
m = 5, a jury should have five people: a teacher, a social worker,
a doctor, a police officer, and a businessperson. Then, there are at
least ten teachers, ten social workers, ten doctors, ten police of-
ficers, and ten businesspeople for ten juries to run in parallel. A
person can choose an occupation by itself before being assigned to
a jury, and it cannot change its occupation inside the jury. There
is a court office which in charge of the jury membership issues.
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Whenever there come m new people in m occupations, the court
office will add these people by reorganising the membership of
every existing jury and then form a new jury. Jury hypothesis is
distinguished from the forest hypothesis because if the adversary
controls two social workers, they cannot live inside the same jury;
however, they can be inside the same sub-area of the forest when
recording the tree falling time. The difficulty in fulfilling the Jury
hypothesis is to divide the people intom occupations equally.
3.2 Jury Membership
A new participant needs to choose an occupation and report to the
court office before the court office can assign it to a jury (Shard).
When adding new people to the court system, the court office should
give preference to the people of seniority (the peoplewho reported
to the office earlier but has not yet been added to the system). As-
sumingm = 5 and six new people in five different occupations are
waiting to be added to the system, person A and person B are in
the same occupation. The court office would add person A to the
system with the other new people in other occupations if person
A reported to the office earlier than B. Person B will then be put in
the pending status until there comes four new people in the other
four occupations.
The court office periodically publishes the number of people in
every occupation who reported to the office and is waiting to be
assigned to a jury. So that when a new participant decides its oc-
cupation, it will check the pending queue of every occupation and
choose an unpopular occupation to get into the system quicker. If
it lines in a long queue, it will need towait until there come enough
people to fill in the shorter queues. Because new participants tend
to line in the shorter queue, the number of people in every occu-
pation is automatically close to each other (tend to be equal in the
long run). If people change its occupation after reporting to the
court office, it will be placed to the tail of the pending queue of the
new occupation. Thus, changing an occupationwastes the position
in the original pending queue.
The person, regardless if it is inside a jury or in the waiting
queue, should work (generate PoW s) in every fixed time window.
Thus the same as the other blockchain sharding models, the adver-
sary who has half of the overall energy can only have half of the
people in the system.
Table 1,2,3,4 and 5 show the procedure of adding people into
the system. In this procedure, we rule that whenever there are at
least four pending people in every occupation, adding starts. Table
1 shows the pending queue published by the court office at the
moment one. Table 2 shows the pending queues when the adding
conditions are meet after moment one before moment two. Table
3 shows the pending queue at the moment two. Table 4 shows the
people in the court system at the moment one. Table 5 shows the
people in the court system at the moment two where some new
people are added.
As can be seen from the adding procedure, if the Adversary is
not in a very long queue, there is no gain for the Adversary to
change the occupation once it reports to the court office. If it does
so, it goes to the tail of another queue, leaving its original place to
others. Then, it still needs to wait until there comes more people
in other queues before it can be added to the system.
Table 1: The pending queues published by the court office at
moment 1. Letters in red colors are pending people.
Occupation I II III IV V
A
B
C E
D F G H I
Number of Pending person 4 2 1 1 1
Table 2: The pending queues aftermoment 1 beforemoment
2. letters in blue color stand for the pending people who re-
ported to the office after moment 1 before moment 2. Be-
cause the minimum length of the queues reached four (pre-
defined adding parameter), the front four people of every
queue should be added to the system in moment 2.
Occupation I II III IV V
U V
A Q R S T
Add to court system -> B M N O P
C E J K L
D F G H I
Number of Pending person 4 4 5 4 5
Table 3: The pending queues published by the court office at
moment 2. Selected people in Table 2 has been assigned to
the court system.
Occupation I II III IV V
U V
Number of Pending person 0 0 1 0 1
Table 4: People in the court system at moment 1. There is
only one jury running.
Ocp
Court
1
Occupation I !
Occupation II @
Occupation III #
Occupation IV $
Occupation V *
Table 5: People in the court system at moment 2. All mem-
bership is adjusted with four more juries formed.
Ocp
Court
1 2 3 4 5
Occupation I A C B D !
Occupation II @ Q M F E
Occupation III R N # J G
Occupation IV S O H K $
Occupation V T * P I L
3.3 Failure Probability
Table 6 shows a court schedule table for ten courts run in parallel
with the jury sized five, and ten people in each of every occupation.
In Table 6, A refers to the adversary person, H refers to the honest
person.
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Table 6: Court Jury Schedule
Ocp
Court
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Occupation I A A A A A H H H H H
Occupation II H A H A H A H A H A
Occupation III A H A H A H A H A H
Occupation IV H A H H A A H A H A
Occupation V H H H H A A A A H A
For a s number of the jury meeting to be held in parallel, there
is a s number of people in each occupation. Let the adversary has
Ai number of the person in Occupation i ; then the chance for the
adversary to secure a manipulated sentence is (assuming without
loss of generality that the adversary puts all its nodes into the front
T occupations)
Pr [T ] =
T∏
i=1
Ai
s
(2)
where T is the number of the person the adversary must take in a
jury to manipulate the sentence.
To derive the maximised Pr [T ], we want
∏
T
i=1Ai to be max-
imised because s is the same. Let the adversary has AD number
of people inside the system (Court Jury Schedule), then AD =∑
m
i=1Ai . To let the value of
∏
T
i=1Ai maximise, we consider
Ai = ⌈(AD/T )⌉, i ∈ [1,AD mod T ] (3)
Ai = ⌊(AD/T )⌋, i ∈ (AD mod T ,T ] (4)
This scenario is the maximised because given any positive inte-
ger X ,
X ∗ X > (X − 1) ∗ (X + 1) = X ∗ X − 1. (5)
Thus,
Pr [T ]max ≈ (
AD
T ∗ s
)T (6)
IfT =m (all the people in the jury should reach the same verdict
when making a sentence), then
Pr [T =m]max ≈ (
AD
s ∗m
)m (7)
Let AD = s∗m2 (half of the overall population) then
Pr [T =m]max ≈ (
1
2
)m (8)
Though the adversary cannot manipulate a sentence when it
does not have T people inside a Shard, it can halt a sentence to be
reached when it has m − T + 1 number of the nodes in a Shard.
Then this sentence cannot be made until the next court (the group
of juries are re-selected). Thus, to make the system function more
smoothly, we want T ≈ [m/2] while meeting the security thresh-
old (e.g. 10−6 failure chance). Figure 3 shows the maximum failure
chance with different s ,n = s∗m = 2000,T = 0.7∗m andAD = 1000
(1/2 fraction of the overall population).
As can be seen from the result, when there are ten Shards and
n/2 people being evil, the failure chance is below 10−20, which sig-
nificantly outperformed the RapidChain at below 10−6 when it has
ten Shards and only n/3 nodes being evil. If we set the block inter-
val to be 30minutes , then it takes over 1015 years to fail the system.
If it is 10minutes (the same as Nakamoto blockchain), it still takes
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Figure 3: the chance to fail with different s when n = 2000
andm = n/s where s is the number of Shards;
over 1014 years to fail. If we maintain the 10−6 failure chances at
this circumstance withT = 0.7 ∗m, then there can be 33 Shards at
the same time.
4 POTENTIAL USAGE
It has been a long-standing question for how to open the member-
ship in a distributed system while maintaining the performance
of distributed jobs as well as the integrity and correctness of the
job results [6, 7]. How to enable nodes in the different background
to participate and tolerant them go offline without notice while
stabilised the system as a whole [8]. By increasing the Byzantine-
fault-tolerant rate as well as the performance of the Blockchain
Sharding approach, the improved Blockchain Sharding approach
may solve these standing problems. For example, a data grid and
distributed database can allow their users to be a part of the pro-
cessing system. IoT devices can be governed decentralised by the
transparent rule of laws [9–11], in this way, waived the concern
over privacy or even espionage for smart home assistants.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discussed a new Blockchain Sharding approach
thatmaintains the system integritywhen there are at mostn/2 frac-
tion of adversary nodes. Compared to the previous work, the re-
quired number of nodes per Shard is much lower and more Shards
are allowed to exist with the same security threshold.
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